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Abstract
Using a dataset covering the population of Danish private-sector
workers, I analyze the relationship between job changes and wage
dynamics. I ￿nd that the number of past job changes is positively
related to wages. This result is consistent with the idea that workers
changing ￿rms end up with better matches than workers who do not
change ￿rms. The main ￿ndings are veri￿ed using the U.S. NLSY panel
data, implying that they can not be attributed to the peculiarities of
the Danish labor market.
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11 Introduction
Search, matching and switching costs are commonly used frameworks for
investigating job transitions. In the most standard matching model, that of
Becker (1973), almost any production function will give the result that more
able workers should match with better jobs. In more dynamic extensions,
a worker changes jobs when he receives an o⁄er from a ￿rm for which he is
a better match and the higher wages exceed a switching cost. The decision
to switch may be in￿ uenced by the stock of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital at a
current employer. Firm-speci￿c human capital is destroyed when a worker
switches employers. Search and switching cost theories predict that workers
with more speci￿c human capital and better matches will be less likely to
leave their employers.
The predictions of matching theories are ambiguous about the cross-
sectional correlations between the number of jobs a worker of a given age
has held and his match quality. One empirical possibility is that those work-
ers who remain at their jobs for a long time do so in part because they have
high matches, while those workers who switch ￿rms do so because they have
low matches and want to improve match quality through switching in or-
der to catch up to those with initial high matches. A second possibility is
that workers who voluntarily switch employers end up with match qualities
that exceed those of workers who do not switch. Reasons for switching often
to upgrade match quality include a plethora of opportunities, lower search,
switching or hiring costs, and a general human capital gain from broad ex-
perience at multiple employers.
The empirical evidence in this paper supports the possibility that work-
ers who voluntarily switch employers often have higher match qualities than
those who do not switch. I regress wages on ￿rm and industry tenure and
approximations to the number of past voluntary job changes. The null hy-
2pothesis is that voluntary switching is motivated by a desire to improve poor
matches. Under the null, the cross sectional regression of wage on the num-
ber of past jobs a worker has held should yield a 0 or negative coe¢ cient,
as the number of past jobs is not a proxy for match quality, or is negatively
correlated with match quality. I estimate a low coe¢ cient on ￿rm tenure and
a high positive coe¢ cient on the number of past job changes, which is not
consistent with the null but consistent with the conclusion that workers who
switch ￿rms more often have better matches.
Since the number of past jobs a worker has held measures both volun-
tary switches and involuntary switches due to layo⁄s, I examine alternative
measures that attempt to measure only voluntary switches, and indeed the
more targeted voluntary switching measures are more correlated with wages.
I also use the panel and universal coverage aspects of our data to show our
results are not due to correlation of wages with time invariant worker and
￿rm characteristics. Further, I use the panel aspect of the data to compute
wage changes, and show that workers experiencing ￿rm switches earn higher
wage changes than other workers.
I am also concerned that my empirical ￿nding that the number of past
￿rm switches a worker has had is positively correlated with his current wage
is an artifact of institutional details in Denmark. This is especially true
because some rough empirical evidence in Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) sug-
gests that the correlation is negative in the United States: workers who switch
￿rms often are negatively sorted by worker ability. I use the American Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Youth, as prepared by Pavan (2005), to analyze
whether current wages are positively or negatively correlated with past ￿rm
changes. For workers and a count of ￿rm changes over the age of 25, I ￿nd a
positive correlation for ￿rm changes not corresponding to a year away from
the labor market. This suggests that, even in the United States, most ￿rm
changes increase the match quality of a worker. Of course, switching ￿rms
3causes a worker to lose ￿rm-speci￿c human capital. I include controls for
￿rm tenure, and the coe¢ cients on ￿rm tenure vary in sign and magnitude
with the sample and controls used.
In summary, this paper provides empirical evidence that workers who
switched ￿rms often in the past earn higher wages. This e⁄ect is of a greater
order of magnitude than the correlation between ￿rm wages and tenure. I
argue that this ￿nding is consistent with a story where voluntarily switching
￿rms often leads to better matches than those held by workers who do not
switch.
The empirical work in this paper uses as its base data a complete panel of
all Danish citizens from 1980￿ 2001. In the empirical work, I restrict attention
to only employed workers in the private sector who have ￿nished school.
This massive dataset allows me to observe worker labor market histories
after 1980 and to precisely measure ￿rm sizes and growth levels. I can also
include worker and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects when appropriate, although most of our
wage regressions use as outcomes only wages in 2001 to make computing
standard errors simpler. As this paper is about worker turnover, note that
in Denmark about 30% of workers switch employers in a given year. Overall
levels of worker tenure are similar to those in Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom.
Section 2 of this paper discusses matching and the implied biases in wage
regressions. Section 3 discusses the detailed Danish panel data that we use.
Section 4 also reviews the standard measures of job creation and job destruc-
tion, and presents evidence on the degree of within-industry reallocation in
Denmark. Section 5 shows the cross-sectional correlation between wages and
the number of ￿rms a worker has been employed by, as well as between wage
changes and ￿rm switches over the same time interval. I verify that the most
important results from Denmark also hold in US data. Finally, Section 6
4concludes.
2 Assortative Matching and Wage Regressions
The basic model of the labor market I rely on this paper is simple. There
are workers and ￿rms. Each ￿rm is decomposed into jobs, and workers
match to jobs. The output of a match is a combination of the ability (time
invariant ability plus accumulating human capital) of the worker and the
level of responsibility of the job. Under most commonly used production
functions, such as Cobb-Douglas, output is supermodular or complementary
in the inputs: the cross-derivative of output with respect to worker input and
job responsibility is positive. Under the famous result from matching theory
of Becker (1973), in a labor market matching equilibrium more able workers
will assortatively match with more responsible jobs1.
Over careers, workers accumulate human capital and match to more re-
sponsible jobs. A worker can match to a more responsible job within his
existing ￿rm, or at a new ￿rm. Moving to a new ￿rm may entail search or
paying switching or hiring cost. The heterogeneous nature of workers and
jobs means it is often e¢ cient to move a worker to a new job in another ￿rm,
even with the associated costs.
The matching model of the labor market presents estimation problems
because complete measures of worker ability and job responsibility are not
found in labor market data. I model wages as monotonic functions of match
production. If production is Cobb-Douglas in inputs and compensation is
some common percentage markdown of production, one speci￿cation for the
1Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2004) extend Becker (1973)￿ s result to models
with forward looking agents engaging in search.
5wages of worker i and a job a at some employer d at time t is
logWiadt = ￿0 + ￿ftfirmtenureidt + ￿itindustrytenureit + ￿eexperienceit
+￿cfirmchangesit + ￿sfirmsizedt + #adt + ￿i + "adit (1)
where ￿rm tenure is the number of years the worker has been at ￿rm d,
industry tenure is the number of years the worker has been employed by
￿rms similar to d, experience is the number of years the worker has been in
the labor market, the number of ￿rm changes is the number of past times
a worker has switched employers, #adt is the unmeasured responsibility or
other characteristic of job a at ￿rm d, ￿i is an unmeasured characteristic
re￿ ecting time invariant worker ability, and "adit is a match or match-year
speci￿c unobserved component. The parameter ￿ft is the causal e⁄ect of
accumulating speci￿c human capital on production and hence wages, ￿it
is the causal e⁄ect of industry (or career) speci￿c capital on wages, ￿e is
the causal e⁄ect of totally general human capital, ￿c is the causal e⁄ect of
accumulating general human capital through broad experiences in di⁄erent
companies, and ￿s is the causal e⁄ect of the unmeasured ￿rm productivity,
rent-sharing or e¢ ciency wage process captured by a ￿rm￿ s past success as
proxied for by its size.
Becker￿ s two-sided matching theory predicts that workers assortively match
to jobs: jobs with more responsibility will have more capable workers, in both
observed and unobserved characteristics. The correlation of characteristics
such as ￿rm tenure with unobserved job and worker characteristics such as
#adt and ￿i causes least squares to produce biased estimates of the parameters
￿ . The high-level nature of labor market data suggests that the contribu-
tion of unmeasured characteristics to production is likely to be large, and
the logic of assortative matching then opens the possibility that the biases
in estimation are large.
A dynamic extension of Becker￿ s logic allows that the inputs of workers
6and ￿rms into production change over time. Workers accumulate more hu-
man capital and ￿rms experience success or failure in their product market
activities. Thus, over time the optimal sorting of workers to jobs changes.
Within a ￿rm, workers may be promoted to higher-ranked positions. Across
￿rms, a ￿rm may have an opening and it may be e¢ cient to ￿ll that opening
with a worker from another ￿rm, even if there are search, switching and hir-
ing costs. Also across ￿rms, it may be e¢ cient to leave slots un￿lled in less
productive ￿rms, meaning that more productive ￿rms will become larger as
it is e¢ cient to match more workers with more productive ￿rms.
The nature of across ￿rm switches means that it is impossible to take
positions in other ￿rms while retaining ￿rm-speci￿c human capital. Thus,
with multiple inputs in production, it is technologically impossible to per-
fectly assortative match in all inputs. Thus, it is an empirical issue about
what inputs will drive equilibrium matching we see in the data, and hence
the biases in least squares estimation of the wage regression.
Consider two extreme views about how workers move between ￿rms. The
￿rst view is consistent with the costly search model of Jovanovic (1979b).
There is no human capital gain to accumulating experience in multiple ￿rms
(￿c = 0), and costly investment in speci￿c human capital only takes place
for workers not planning on switching ￿rms. Workers only decide to stay at
a ￿rm for several years once they ￿nd a good match and stop searching. For
workers of a given age or experience level, this theory is likely to predict
cov (FirmTenureidt;#adt) > 0 & cov (FirmChangesit;#adt) ￿ 0
The logic for the latter prediction is that ￿rm switches are made so work-
ers with initial bad matches can catch up to the level of match quality of
workers who initially found good matches. In this case, and ignoring more
complex correlations between observable inputs, one might expect that the
￿rm tenure coe¢ cient is biased upwards (taking into account match qual-
7ity in addition to speci￿c human capital accumulation), and that the least
squares estimate of ￿c is negative instead of 0.
A second theoretical possibility is that some workers take better matches
at other ￿rms as a substitute to acquiring speci￿c human capital and being
promoted within the ￿rm. Workers may be willing to switch more than others
because they have low search or switching costs, scarce skills meriting lots of
o⁄ers, or just plain luck at securing o⁄ers. In this case,
cov (FirmTenureidt;#adt) ￿ 0 & cov (FirmChangesit;#adt) > 0
I expect least squares to produce a downward-biased estimate of the re-
turns to tenure, and an upward biased (positive) estimate of the returns to
switching ￿rms, ￿c.
In both cases, the causal human capital accumulation story and the bias
from assortative matching reinforce each other. If speci￿c human capital
dominates resorting, ￿t >> 0, then both the causal human capital e⁄ect and
the matching response through optimal sorting will cause there to be a large
estimated coe¢ cient on ￿rm tenure and a small or negative coe¢ cient on job
changes. If instead workers aggressively switch ￿rms in response to attractive
outside o⁄ers, the match quality bias will cause a high estimate of ￿c, which
is only reinforced if there is a true causal human capital bene￿t to acquiring
a broad array of experiences in di⁄erent ￿rms. If workers aggressively seek to
improve match quality by switching ￿rms, we might expect a negative bias
on the estimated returns to ￿rm tenure.
The results of this paper sugggest that the second story appears to be
closer to the truth: in wage regressions, the coe¢ cient on changing jobs is
high and the coe¢ cient on the returns to tenure is low when both controls are
included. I conclude that workers switching ￿rms to increase match qualities
dominates any selection e⁄ect where workers with high match qualities do
8not move.
3 Data and Measurement
3.1 Danish Matched Employer￿ Employee Data
To investigate the relationship between wages and workers￿labor market
histories, I need data on both individual workers and on the establishments
and ￿rms to which workers have been attached to over their career. I use
the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), which
is the universe of Danish citizens from 1980￿ 2001. Auxiliary ￿les provide
information on individual jobs (a worker may have more than one job) and
physical establishments.
Denmark is a fairly prosperous Northern European country of 5.4 million
people. The commercial base is fairly diversi￿ed with fewer large companies
than, say, Sweden. Denmark had a recession in the early 1990￿ s and was in
an expansion during the period we study. In 2001, the unemployment rate
was fairly low at 4.2%.
Workers in Denmark are mobile by European standards. The data show
30% of workers in the private sector leave their employers in a given year.
According to the OECD, the mean ￿rm tenure in Denmark is similar to
mean tenure in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, and slightly
higher than mean tenure in the United States.
I consider private sector workers. As some workers can hold multiple
jobs at the same time, we consider only a worker￿ s primary job, although we
do consider part time work if that is a worker￿ s primary job. The primary
job is de￿ned as the job for which a worker has worked more than 50% of
9his working time over a given year I also constrain the sample to include
only workers aged 25 to 44. Workers younger than 25 are often in school
or working in jobs that are not part of their ￿nal careers. The restriction
to workers younger than 45 arises from data limitations. The data cover
the period 1980￿ 2001, so workers younger than 45 in 2001 were younger
than 24 in 1980, meaning at most they had just started their careers. For
workers older then 45 in 2001, the lack of data on ￿rm changes before 1980 is
problematic as these workers may have sorted into high-paying jobs through
a unobserved (in our data) search process in their earlier years.
The wage regressions focus on the six-year period 1996￿ 2001. To make
the analysis transparent by including only one observation per worker, most
of our wage regressions focus on data for 2001. Some regressions use log wage
changes as the dependent variable. Wage changes are measured over either
1996￿ 2001 or 2000￿ 2001.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for 2001. The sample consists of
731,358 workers, 44% of which are full time (de￿ned as working more than
30 hours a week). The total number of Danish workers in 2001 is 2,430,178, so
private sector and age restricted sample contains 30% of workers in Denmark
in 2001. Table 1 shows some noti￿able di⁄erences between part time and
full time workers. Part time workers are more likely to be female, work
in larger ￿rms (measured by the size of full time equivalent workers), have
less experience and have more schooling than full time workers.The higher
schooling for part time workers appears even for men above age 35, so it is
probably not an artifact of college graduates working part time while earning
graduate degrees.
103.2 Labor Market History Measures
I use the full time period, 1980￿ 2001, to track labor market history variables
such as the tenure of a worker at his current ￿rm, the tenure of a worker in
his industry and a worker￿ s number of past ￿rm changes. As I am concerned
with spurious changes in ￿rm identi￿cation codes, I only code a worker as
switching ￿rms if both his ￿rm and establishment identi￿ers change at the
same time. I calculated alternative versions of some of labor history measures
using social security records from 1969￿ 1979. My versions of the 1969￿ 1979
data lack establishment identi￿ers, so I cannot correct tenure and the number
of ￿rm changes for spurious ￿rm identi￿er changes. Nevertheless, to check the
robustness of the results, I constructed ￿rm tenure using data back to 1969.
I also computed tenure taking into account the fact that workers can hold
multiple jobs at the same time, as considering only the primary job could lead
to an undercounting of ￿rm tenure. The wage regression results in both cases
were economically quite similar. Industry is recorded at the establishment
or plant level. I construct industry tenure using the 8 following groups of
industries: (1) agriculture and mining, (2) manufacturing, (3) construction
and transport, (4) retail, hotels and restaurants, (5) ￿nance, real estate and
R&D activities, (6) public sector, (7) private households and extraterritorial
activities and (8) others. The estimation sample considers workers only in the
￿rst ￿ve industry groups, which we call the private sector. I also constructed
industry tenure using more detailed 2, 3 and 4-digit industry codes. The wage
regression coe¢ cients are similar with the narrower de￿nitions of industry
tenure. Denmark is a small country, so narrowly de￿ned industries have only
a few ￿rms in them.
I construct several measures of ￿rm changes. I ￿rst count the number of
past ￿rm changes, meaning the number of di⁄erent employers a worker has
experienced since he is active in the labor market. I only count the number
11of ￿rm changes that occurred after a worker￿ s last graduation from school,
as the type of work a graduate does may be unrelated to work done before
or during school. Second, I decompose the number of ￿rm changes into what
we call "exits" and "non-exits". Exits occur when a worker changes his
employer but disappears from the active labor force for at least a year in the
data. Reasons for not being in the active labor force can be unemployment,
temporary leave, maternity leave, and leaving Denmark, among others. Non-
exits are ￿rm changes where the worker is observed to be employed in two
consecutive years. As we are concerned that later career ￿rm changes may be
of a di⁄erent nature than early-career moves, we disaggregate the variables
exits and non-exits by two age intervals: exits (non-exits) when the worker
is 25 to 34 years old and exits (non-exits) when the worker is 35 to 44 years
old.
Firm and industry tenure are topcoded at 21 years for those workers who
did not switch employers over the entire period. As I use indicator variables
in tenure ranges to capture nonlinearities, the topcoded observations are
lumped into the top categories. Total labor market experience is computed
by the national statistics agency, using social security records from 1969￿
2001.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for labor market history measures for
the year 2001. Firm tenure and industry tenure are higher for full time than
for part time workers. In terms of the number of past ￿rm changes and its
decomposition into exits and non-exits, both types of workers exhibit similar
patterns: the mean number of ￿rm switches is three, and 80% (2.2/3) of the
switches do not involve an exit from the labor market for at least a year.
More ￿rm switches occur between ages 25￿ 34 then between ages 35￿ 44. In
Table 2, the number of exits in the two listed age categories do not sum to
the total number of exits after graduation because workers with lower levels
of schooling may have their last graduation before age 25. The data list the
12last graduation year of each individual because the data are collected from
governmental registers.
Figure 1 plots histograms of the total number of ￿rm changes as well as the
numbers of exits and non-exits since the last graduation for the sample. For
the year 2001, roughly 10% of the workers aged 25￿ 45 had zero ￿rm changes
since graduation. The modal number of ￿rm changes is two. Workers who
have experienced at most four changes of employers represent 75% of the
distribution. Regarding exits, nearly 50% of the workers between 25 and 45
years old in 2001 have never been out of the labor market while 20% have
exited the labor market at least twice.
Table 3 shows summary statistics by industry for the sample of private
sector workers aged 25￿ 45 in 2001. Manufacturing and agriculture have the
highest share of full time workers, while ￿nance and retail have the smallest
share. Agriculture and construction & transport have the lowest shares of
women. There is across-industry heterogeneity in the size of ￿rms, with
agriculture being dominated by small ￿rms, which may be small family-
owned ￿rms. Mean ￿rm tenure for the sample of younger workers is relatively
constant across industries at 3.5 years, but for manufacturing it is 4.4 years.
All the private sector industries have mean levels of industry tenure of ￿ve
years or more. An important variable in this paper is the number of past
￿rm changes. In the sample of workers aged 25￿ 45, workers change ￿rms
times on average between 2.6 and 3.5 times since graduation.
One concern with Table 3 is that many of the labor market history vari-
ables are correlated with worker age and experience, and the distribution of
age and experience may vary across industries. The bottom half of Table 3
repeats the sample statistics on the labor market history variables for work-
ers of the constant age of 35. Many of the across-industry di⁄erences remain,
although there are decreases in the across-industry variation in the number
13of past ￿rm changes and industry tenure.
4 Labor Market Histories and Wages
Section 2 outlines two extreme empirical possibilities, both consistent with
assortative matching between ￿rms and workers. Workers may seek out good
matches and invest in speci￿c human capital, and those workers switch-
ing ￿rms either have had poor matches or have been laid o⁄. Alterna-
tively, worker switching may be dominated by workers who have voluntarily
switched for more attractive outside o⁄ers. I estimate log wages regressions
with the standard proxies for ￿rm, industry and general human capital, and
then consider if and how the number of past ￿rm changes is correlated with
workers￿wages. I present a new empirical fact that wages are positively cor-
related with the number of past ￿rm changes. This is surprising, as rough
evidence in Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) suggests that wages of American
workers are negatively correlated with the number of past jobs. To check that
my result is not purely a consequence of institutional details of the Danish
labor market, I use data from the American National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) to show that wages of American workers are positively
correlated with the number of past ￿rm changes.
4.1 Danish Data
Table 4 reports regression results from estimating a variant of equation (1)
with the Danish data. I use as control variables an indicator for being fe-
male, four groups of completed degrees (compulsory, vocational training, the
Danish equivalent of community college, college and above) and the log of
￿rm size. The log of ￿rm size controls for the often reported ￿nding that
14larger employers pay higher wages. Most speci￿cation include two-digit in-
dustry ￿xed e⁄ects to control for di⁄erences in compensation policies across
industries. Aside from total labor market experience, all of the labor mar-
ket history coe¢ cients that we report modify indicator variables for di⁄erent
intervals, as in many cases the estimated e⁄ects are nonlinear. The ￿rst
column reports estimates of the predicted wage e⁄ects of ￿rm tenure, with
tenure split into intervals of 1￿ 2 years, 3￿ 5 years, 6￿ 9 years, and more than
10 years. The excluded category is workers brand new to an employer, with
0 years of ￿rm tenure. The second column adds industry tenure while the
third column adds the number of past ￿rm changes. I experimented with dif-
ferent intervals, and choose these to represent both the variation in the point
estimates and the fraction of the worker observations in each of the intervals.
I include total labor market experience as a quadratic because experience is
not a focus of this analysis.
The ￿rst column of Table 4 is a base speci￿cation that estimates the corre-
lation of wages with general and speci￿c human capital variables, education,
experience and ￿rm tenure. The quadratic of experience is maximized at
19 years at a log-wage e⁄ect of 0.36 points. Firm tenure exhibits a inverted
U-shape: workers with 1￿ 2 years of ￿rm tenure are predicted to earn 2.2%
more than workers brand new to an employer, and this predicted correlation
grows to 4% for workers with 6￿ 9 years of tenure. Workers with more than
10 years of tenure at the same ￿rm earn a predicted 2.0% more than brand
new workers, but the same coe¢ cient implies they earn 4.0-2.0=2.0 less than
workers with 6￿ 9 years of tenure. The lower point estimates for workers with
high levels of ￿rm tenure is the ￿rst suggestive evidence that workers who
switch ￿rms are not heavily penalized. Also, note that the overall magni-
tude of the ￿rm tenure coe¢ cients is relatively small, with at most a 4% gap
between categories of workers.
Neal (1995), Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) and Pavan (2005) present
15evidence that the (larger) ￿rm tenure coe¢ cients in American data go away
when measure of industry, occupational or "career" (a combination of indus-
try and occupation) tenure variables are included. The second column of
Table 4 controls for industry tenure and, as in the US, the estimated ￿rm
tenure coe¢ cients change dramatically. Industry tenure appears to have
a very strong predictive correlation with wages (between 3.3% and 9.4%,
peaking at the end of the distribution of industry tenure) and crowds out
completely the e⁄ect of ￿rm tenure. Now ￿rm tenure is negatively corre-
lated with wages, meaning that workers who remain at a single ￿rm longer
tend to earn lower wages. Barring explanations focused on correlation with
unobservables, a likely explanation for the change in signs on the industry
tenure coe¢ cients is that it is the type of work that a worker has experience
in that matters, not the speci￿c project he is working on at his current ￿rm.
A worker￿ s industry is a proxy for the type of work he does.
The primary theoretical goal of this section is to establish whether my
data on ￿rm switching is dominated by workers voluntarily switching for
higher outside o⁄ers, or workers being laid o⁄and accepting worse jobs. The
third column adds the number of past ￿rm changes. Having changed ￿rms
often in the past is highly correlated with the wages of workers. A worker who
has switched ￿rms once previously is predicted to earn 1.8% higher wages
than a worker who has never switched ￿rms since his last graduation. The
coe¢ cient for the ￿rm changes intervals increase with the number of changes.
A worker who has moved between six and nine times in the past earns 6.1%
more than a worker who has never moved. The magnitude of the e⁄ects of
￿rm tenure almost completely die o⁄ towards zero, while the coe¢ cients on
total labor market experience and industry tenure are remarkably invariant
to the inclusion of the number of past ￿rm changes.
The result that wages are positively correlated with the number of past
￿rms is, to my knowledge, new to this paper. I replicate a similar result using
16US panel data below, so the result is unlikely to be due to some institutional
peculiarity of the Danish labor market. In the assortative matching frame-
work of Section 2, the positive correlation between wages and the number of
past ￿rm changes is consistent with the hypothesis that those workers who
switch ￿rms often have better unmeasured matches than those who do not
switch ￿rms. It is also consistent with a story where switching ￿rms causes
a worker to accumulate broad general human capital, although we do not
emphasize the broad general human capital story here.
The fourth column considers only male full time workers. These workers
are likely to be highly committed to the labor market. For this group, ￿rm
tenure has an ever smaller (in absolute value) correlation with wages, and the
magnitudes of the correlation between wages and experience and industry
tenure are smaller. The coe¢ cients on the number of past ￿rm changes
remain similar.
The previous results show the within-industry but across-￿rm wage out-
comes of workers with di⁄erent labor market histories. These regressions
document variation that is relevant when investigating the wage outcomes of
workers as they switch between ￿rms in the same industry, the motivating
mental experiment in this paper.
Some of the previous results may represent the matching of workers to
￿rms with di⁄erent levels of compensation. It is interesting to investigate
whether the labor market histories of workers matter once they match to
the same ￿rm. The ￿fth column of Table 4 uses the fact that we observe
all the workers at each ￿rm to estimate the labor history coe¢ cients while
controlling for a ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect, using the same 2001 cross section. Adding
a ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect restores the positive coe¢ cients on ￿rm tenure found in the
￿rst column, and reduces the coe¢ cients on the number of past ￿rm changes
by about half. Now a worker with no past ￿rm changes and six years of
17tenure at his current ￿rm earns about the same as a worker at the same ￿rm
with no ￿rm tenure and six past ￿rm changes.
Including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects is not possible in typical US panel datasets, so
the results when controlling for ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects questions the interpretation
of the across-￿rm results of Neal (1995), Kambourov and Manovskii (2002)
and Pavan (2005) that ￿nd that ￿rm tenure is only weakly correlated with
wages once other measures of career capital are included. It is possible that
￿rm tenure is a predictor of wages within a ￿rm, but not across ￿rms2.
The sixth column of Table 4 estimates the e⁄ect of ￿rm tenure and ￿rm
changes by using the pooled sample from 1996 to 2001 and adding worker
￿xed e⁄ects. I control for in￿ ation using year indicators. Firm tenure in-
creases in importance when it is identi￿ed o⁄of within-worker variation, and
industry tenure decreases in importance. What is most interesting is that
the coe¢ cients on the number of past ￿rm changes dramatically increase in
magnitude. A worker who has had one ￿rm change is now predicted to earn
0.17 log points (19%) more than a worker with no ￿rm changes. Worker ￿xed
e⁄ect regressions are identi￿ed using changes in log wages, and we look more
directly at wage changes below.
One constant in all the speci￿cations in Table 4 is that wages are posi-
tively correlated with the number of past ￿rm changes of a worker. Whether
one prefers purely cross-sectional results, results using within-￿rm variation,
or results using within-worker variation over a six year interval, the results
all show that wages are positively correlated with past ￿rm changes.
Firm switches can be broadly grouped into two categories: switches a
2Note that the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects estimates do not capture the type of facts that should
be of interest to workers considering switching ￿rms. To a ￿rst approximation, a worker
who wants to switch ￿rms cares whether his wage will increase, not whether his wage will
be higher than other workers at his new ￿rm.
18worker makes relatively involuntarily (or to satisfy a non-monetary objective)
and often end in lower wages, and ￿rm switches that secure a worker a
better position at a higher wage. Any data on ￿rm switches will have a
combination of these two types of ￿rm changes. While I do not observe
the reason for a ￿rm change, I can use the panel aspect of the data to
divide past moves into two categories. I consider the number of ￿rm moves
that led to an exit from the active labor market for a year (we label these
￿rms changes exits) and the number of ￿rm moves where the worker was
employed in consecutive years (non-exits). The reason for switching ￿rms
may systematically di⁄er for workers in their mid-twenties and mid-thirties,
so we di⁄erentiate exits and non-exits by the age intervals of 25￿ 35 and over
35 (labelled # exits btw 35/44). As before, I only consider wages in the
year 2001. All speci￿cations include as controls industry tenure, experience,
four groups of completed degrees, female, the log of ￿rm size and two-digit
industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Importantly, the measures of exits and non-exits are
the counts of exits and non-exits. I do not include intervals as before, so we
can concisely report the four di⁄erent measures of past ￿rm changes. Figure
1 reports typical values of exits and non-exits.
Table 5 reports regressions of the log of the hourly wage on the numbers
of exits and non-exits. The ￿rst column reports the estimates for the entire
sample. Workers who at some point in their career exit the labor market
are predicted to earn lower wages. One exit in their mid-twenties lowers the
prediction of wages by 0.6% while taking a year away from the labor market
in the mid-thirties is equivalent to 2.3% decrease. The negative coe¢ cients
on exits are quite similar to past ￿ndings that workers experience a decrease
in wages if they are laid o⁄(Neal, 1995; Farber, 2005). However, experiencing
many ￿rm changes without observed gaps in employment is highly positively
correlated with one￿ s current wages. The linear prediction suggests that
one non-exit ￿rm change in the mid-twenties predicts a 1.7% higher current
19wage. The coe¢ cient on non-exits in the mid-thirties and above is similar.
Compared with the third column of Table 6, ￿rm tenure has a slightly higher
impact in that all workers with positive tenures are predicted to earn 0.8%￿
1.6% higher wages than workers brand new to a ￿rm, the excluded category.
The other columns use di⁄erent samples to validate the robustness of the
fact that ￿rm changes in the form of non-exits are correlated with higher
wages. Column 2 considers only full-time men, column 3 considers workers
of both sexes with a college degree or more, column 4 uses highly educated
men and, in the last two columns, we compare the manufacturing sector
to the other private sector industries. For the past ￿rm changes variables,
we obtain roughly similar estimates for full-time men and when using the
separate subsample for each industry. The ￿rm tenure coe¢ cient estimates
are higher in manufacturing than in the other industries.
For workers with a college degree or more (columns 3 and 4), wages are
positively correlated with all types of past ￿rm changes. Exits have a pos-
itive coe¢ cient, but the incremental di⁄erence between the coe¢ cients for
exits and non-exits remain similar to the entire sample. For highly educated
workers, workers who switch ￿rms often empirically earn higher wages, even
if the moves involve time away from employment in the data. Focusing on
highly educated men only in column 4 rules out any e⁄ect from maternity
leave. One possibility is that some of the measured exits re￿ ect work being
done in other countries, as workers in the European Union have the ￿ exibil-
ity to live and work in other member states. Highly educated workers are
presumably more likely to take advantage of this opportunity. The foreign
work explanation does not explain the even higher coe¢ cients on non-exists
for this sample. A past ￿rm change for a worker between 25￿ 35 predicts a
4% higher wage in 2001. The ￿rm tenure coe¢ cients are large, even though
we control for industry tenure and the number of past ￿rm changes. How-
ever, it is likely that changes in industry are poor measures of changes in
20occupation for workers who have lots of general human capital through uni-
versity level training. These workers may include managers, lawyers and
other professionals who can work for ￿rms in multiple sectors.
The speci￿cation (column 6) in Table 4 with worker ￿xed e⁄ects uses
innovations in a worker￿ s ￿rm changes variable to predict changes in the
worker￿ s wages. However, in a ￿xed e⁄ects regression all of the coe¢ cients
on controls are estimated using within-worker variation (di⁄erences from the
1996￿ 2001 worker-speci￿c means) as well. I want to more directly look at the
correlation between the number of ￿rm changes in a period and the changes in
a worker￿ s wage over that period, while allowing for the empirical possibility
that wage changes themselves vary across industries, schooling groups, sexes
and across the values of the other controls.
Table 6 presents cross-sectional regressions of the change in log wages
between 1996 and 2001 on the number of ￿rm changes (exits and non-exits)
over that period. I present ￿ve speci￿cations: the entire sample employed in
the private sector in both 1996 and 2001 (column 1), full-time men (column
2), highly educated men (column 3), the entire sample with a ￿xed e⁄ect for
the ￿rm employing a worker in 2001 (column 4) and the entire sample with
a ￿xed e⁄ect for the ￿rm where the worker is employed in 1996 (columns 5
and 6). Column 5 contains the 2001 values of other controls for comparisons
with the other columns, and column 6 uses the 1996 values of controls.
The mean nominal log wage change between 1996 and 2001 is 0.17 log
wage points. As all wage changes are measured over the same time inter-
val, as long as an intercept is included, the other coe¢ cients have the same
coe¢ cients that would arise if we used real wage changes. Across the sam-
ples (with one exception), one ￿rm change over the period is predicted to
increase the log wage change by 0.02 to 0.033 log points. So one ￿rm change
corresponds to about 0.025/0.17=0.15, or 15% of the mean level of wage
21increases.
The last column of Table 6 uses the 1996 values of ￿rm and industry
tenure, to control for the worker￿ s labor market history before the intervening
￿rm changes occur.
4.2 Veri￿cation Using US Data
The result that wages are positively correlated with the number of past jobs is
an empirical fact suggesting that voluntary switches to receive higher outside
wage o⁄ers to some degree dominate ￿rm switching in Denmark. Previous
rough evidence from Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) for the United States sug-
gests the opposite: wages are negatively correlated with the number of past
￿me changes, at least for older men. A negative correlation suggests that
those who switch ￿rms are negatively selected, as they earn lower wages.
They present a regression of log wages on tenure, experience, and the number
of past moves. For young men from the 1971 NLS, they report a coe¢ cient on
the number of ￿rm changes that is tiny in magnitude, with a small t-statistic.
For older men in the 1973 NLS, they report a coe¢ cient of -0.048, with a
t-statistic of 1.8. While I do not attempt to replicate their result, I suspect it
primarily originates from considering early career switches, including those
while in school, that occur during a period when younger adults are only
tangentially attached to full-time work.
Since one might be concerned that an empirical fact that is true in Den-
mark but not in the United States may be an artifact of a peculiar Danish
institution, I test whether the correlation between log wages and the number
of past ￿rms is positive or negative in more recent US data. Ronni Pavan has
generously provided access to his cleaned version of the NLSY3. I use his data
3More details of the construction of the data can be found in Pavan (2005).
22on full time male workers, so part time and secondary jobs are not included.
Although I lack graduation in dates, in what follows, I follow the same strat-
egy than with the Danish data and consider only men age 25 and older, as
well as only ￿rm switches that occur for age 25 and above. The highest
age in the NLSY data is 37. I construct the intervals both for ￿rm changes
and non-exits to best capture the variation in the data present. There are
few exits in the sample of full-time men, so we include only an indicator for
positive (1+) exits.
Table 7 presents regressions of log wages on the number of past ￿rm
switches for the US data. The ￿rst three columns report OLS estimations
and are di⁄erentiated by the tenure variables used as controls. The ￿rst
column uses industry tenure. Workers with 1 ￿rm change have wages that
are 7.3% higher than a worker with no ￿rm changes, workers with 2 to 3
￿rm changes hav an increase of 3.4% although a worker with 4 or more ￿rm
changes is predicted to have lower wages but this e⁄ect is only signi￿cant at
a 10% level (the point estimate is 4%). The results are similar when industry
tenure (where there are 14 di⁄erent industries in the data) or career tenure4
is added. Table 7 also repeats three regressions when worker ￿xed e⁄ects are
included. Universally, adding worker ￿xed e⁄ects increases the positive value
of the coe¢ cients. A worker with four or more past ￿rm switches is predicted
to have 23% higher wages than a worker who has not switched ￿rms after age
25 (column 3b). The point estimates for ￿rm changes monotonically increase
with the number of past ￿rm changes. The NLSY is not a matched employer￿
employee dataset, so I cannot include ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects or ￿rm characteristics
as controls.
Table 8 reports regressions of the log of the hourly wage on the intervals
4Pavan (2005) uses a concept known as career tenure, where career tenure uses both
occupational and industry codes to attempt to construct a conservative measure of the
number of years since the type of work being performed changed.
23of exits and non-exits. As in Table 7, the di⁄erent speci￿cations are dif-
ferentiated by the tenure variables used as controls. Using industry tenure,
workers with more ￿rm changes accompanied by a year away from the labor
market are predicted to have 6.1% lower wages than a worker with no ￿rm
changes. A worker with 1-3 ￿rm changes not accompanied by an exit has
wages that are higher than a worker with no ￿rm changes (respectively 7.4%
for 1 change and 3.7% for 2 to 3 changes) although a worker with 4 or more
￿rm changes is predicted to have wages that are not statistically di⁄erent
than 0 (the point estimate is 3.0%). Adding industry tenure or career tenure
eliminates the negative e⁄ect of taking a year o⁄ the labor market as the
estimate becomes not signi￿cant from zero. While the estimates of non exits
do not change much when we add industry tenure, once we introduce career
tenure, the di⁄erence between 1 move and 2 to 3 moves inside the labor mar-
ket becomes very slight (respectively 5.9% and 5.1%) .The last three columns
of Table 8 include worker ￿xed e⁄ects. Again, adding worker ￿xed e⁄ects
increases the positive value of the coe¢ cients. For ￿rm switches not accom-
panied by a year o⁄ from the labor market, a worker with four or more past
￿rm switches is predicted to have 23% higher wages than a worker who has
not switched ￿rms after age 25 (column 3b). As for ￿rm changes, the point
estimates for non-exits monotonically increase with the number of no exits.
This section has shown that, in the United States and Denmark, it ap-
pears that workers who have switched ￿rms more times in the past (after age
25) earn higher wages. One interpretation of this fact is there is an underly-
ing reality where more ￿rm moves are voluntary switches for higher outside
wage o⁄ers, rather than involuntary layo⁄s. The results are sharpened if we
focus on ￿rm separations accompanied by time away from the labor market,
which in many speci￿cations are negatively correlated with current wages.
In both Denmark and the United States, the magnitudes of the correlation
between at least some ￿rm changes and wages becomes very large (around
2420% with respect to a worker with no ￿rm changes) once worker ￿xed ef-
fects are included. The larger coe¢ cient estimates with worker ￿xed e⁄ects
are consistent with the possibility that there is some negative selection in
the time invariant ability of the workers that switch ￿rms. For Denmark,
I looked directly at log wage changes over a ￿ve year period. Regressing
log wage changes on the number of ￿rm changes over the ￿ve year period
produces coe¢ cients suggesting that log wage changes are predicted to in-
crease by 0.02 per past switch, compared to mean wage change of 0.17 over
1996￿ 2001.
5 Conclusions
Using a unique linked employer-employee dataset covering the population of
Denmark over more than twenty years, I present strong empirical evidence
that workers who have switched ￿rms repeatedly in the past are predicted to
earn higher wages. This result is consistent with the idea that workers who
move end up with better matches than workers who do not change ￿rms. I
use several measures of ￿rm changes to distinguish among di⁄erent types of
changes. Results were not in￿ uenced by the choice of a speci￿c past ￿rm
changes measure.
To verify that these results are not due to the peculiarities of the Danish
labor market, I replicate the analysis using the U.S. NLSY data. Results
were surprisingly similar accross the two countries, in contrast with the early
work of Mincer and Jovanovic (1981). These results have important pol-
icy implications regarding labor market ￿ exibility and active labor market
policies, and therefore deserve a more thorough examination.
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26Demographic Variables Full time workers Part time workers
Age 34.5 34.1
Female 0.25 0.44
Hourly wage (kroner) 189.3 189.8
Vocational 0.56 0.58
Community college 0.13 0.17
College & masters 0.04 0.06
# observations 319,003 412,355
TABLE 1: DANISH DATA - Demographic Variables
Workers (25  to 44 years old in 2001)Labor Market History Variables Full time workers Part time workers
Experience 13.0 11.7
Firm tenure 4.6 3.2
Industry tenure 6.0 5.0
# firm changes after graduation 3.00 3.02
# exits after graduation 0.77 0.81
# exits - age 25/34 0.41 0.45
# exits - age 35/44 0.09 0.12
# non exits after graduation 2.23 2.21
# non exits - age 25/34 1.12 1.17
# non exits - age 35/44 0.28 0.35
# observations 319,003 412,355
TABLE 2: DANISH DATA - Labor Market History Variables
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exits non exitsVariables Agriculture Manufacture Construction Retail Finance
Full time 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.35 0.31
Female 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.42 0.45
Firm tenure 3.3 4.4 3.4 3.6 3.3
Industry tenure 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.2
# firm changes 3.0 2.9 3.5 2.9 2.6
# observations 16,413 230,775 159,144 187,951 149,496
Full time 0.57 0.56 0.45 0.36 0.32
Female 0.26 0.34 0.23 0.41 0.46
Firm tenure 3.8 4.4 3.5 3.8 3.4
Industry tenure 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.9 5.5
# firm changes 3.6 3.2 3.9 3.3 2.8
# observations 833 14,525 9,257 10,400 9,388
TABLE 3: DANISH DATA - Summary Statistics by Industry
Workers (25  to 44 years old in 2001)
Workers 35 years old onlyFirm Panel
fixed effect 1996-2001
0.038*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.022*** -0.00001 0.005*** 0.0001 0.017*** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0004)
0.040*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.035*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.040*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.005 0.039*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.020*** -0.039*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.032*** 0.049***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.033*** 0.032*** -0.009*** 0.024*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.069*** 0.068*** 0.021*** 0.058*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.086*** 0.087*** 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.094*** 0.97*** 0.060*** 0.097*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
0.018*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.172***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.042*** 0.039*** 0.018*** 0.220***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.061*** 0.058*** 0.029*** 0.236***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
0.068*** 0.068*** 0.030*** 0.227***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
female log of firm size
education year dummiers
firm worker
730,492 730,492 730,492 240,005 730,492 4,314,813
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.49 0.78
female, education (3 groups), log of firm size Controls
industry 2 digit
TABLE 4: DANISH DATA - Wages and Past Firm Changes
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3 to 5 years
6 to 9 years
10 years and up
1 to 2 years
3 to 5 yearsAll Full  time College+ Non 
sample men Men Manufacture
-0.006*** -0.013*** 0.019*** 0.011*** -0.013*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.023*** -0.020*** 0.006 0.022*** -0.032*** -0.019***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
0.017*** 0.014*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.011*** 0.019***
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
0.019*** 0.017*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
0.010*** 0.003 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.015*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
0.016*** 0.007** 0.052*** 0.064*** 0.021*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
0.015*** 0.004 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
0.008*** -0.0001 0.093*** 0.114*** 0.018*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
0.026*** -0.009*** 0.007 -0.002 0.011*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
0.056*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.064***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
0.072*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.082***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
0.082*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.089***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls
730,492 240,005 109,481 72,874 226,671 503,821
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TABLE 5: DANISH DATA - Wages and Past Firm Changes by Exits vs. Non Exits
Dept. Variable:                      
Log of Hourly Wage     
Manufacture College+All Full  time 2001 1996 1996
sample men fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
0.022*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed effect 2001 firm 1996 firm 1996 firm
# observations 545,716 196,522 49,687 545,716 545,716 545,716
R² 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.31
TABLE 6: DANISH DATA - Changes in Wages and Past Firm Changes
Period 1996-2001
Dept. Variable:               
Log of Hourly Wage     
College+
industry 2 digits
experience, experience² , female, education (3 groups), log of firm size
# firm changes over 
1996 - 2001
Controls
2001 values for firm and industry tenure
1996 firm & 
industry tenure0.073*** 0.076*** 0.061*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.130***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
0.034** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.189***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
-0.040* -0.040* 0.027 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.229***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.040) (0.036)
0.039*** 0.032*** 0.010 0.060*** 0.064** 0.034
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021)
-0.0005* -0.0003 0.0004 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
0.065*** 0.058*** 0.014** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.0006 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***










12,776 12,285 12,776 12,776 12,285 12,776
0.22 0.23 0.25 0.70 0.70 0.70
TABLE 7: US DATA (NLSY) - Wages and Past Firm Changes
Dept. Variable:                
Log of Hourly Wage     
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
R²
worker
4 changes and up
1 change







































 --0.061*** -0.031 -0.020 0.041 0.178** 0.065
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.046) (0.070) (0.046)
0.074*** 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.119***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
0.037** 0.041** 0.051*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.180***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
-0.030 -0.031 0.036 0.166*** 0.172*** 0.229***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
0.040*** 0.033*** 0.011* 0.062* 0.141*** 0.041
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.049) (0.033)
-0.0006* -0.0004 0.0003 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
0.064*** 0.058*** 0.014** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.003*** -0.003*** -0.0006 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***










12,776 12,285 12,776 12,776 12,285 12,776
0.22 0.23 0.25 0.70 0.70 0.70
Firm tenure²
TABLE 8: US DATA (NLSY) - Wages and Past Firm Changes by Exits vs. Non Exits
Dept. Variable:                Log 
of Hourly Wage     
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
- 
Industry tenure²  - -  - -
Industry tenure  - -   -
- 
Career tenure²  - -  - -
Career tenure  - -   -
black, education (4 groups), year dummies















4 non exits and up
 1 exit or more 
 1 non exit
 2 to 3 non exits
Experience
Experience²
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